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1831 
Why Aren’t We Using that Intel Stuff?                   
Using Reconnaissance Satellite Imagery in Domestic 
Disaster Prevention and Response 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, the 
commander responsible for coordinating the U.S. military’s 
Hurricane Katrina response, spoke at an intelligence community 
symposium about the contribution intelligence information made 
during Katrina relief efforts.1 While noting the value of such 
intelligence, Honoré explained that conflicting views about the 
legality of its domestic application limited its utility.2 Specifically, he 
stated that while some government officials were advising him that 
satellite intelligence capabilities could not be used within the United 
States, others were asking: “‘Why aren’t you using that intel stuff to 
tell us what’s going on down there?’”3  
By providing disaster planners and responders with a common 
operational picture,4 satellite imagery plays an important role in both 
manmade and natural disaster prevention and response. Former 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John Deutch explained, for 
example, that “within hours after a disaster strikes [analysts] can 
assess and report the nature and scope of the damage—conditions of 
roads, airports, hospitals, and the status of potential secondary 
 
 1. See Tim Shorrock, America Under Surveillance: Granted New Power to Spy Inside the 
U.S., the Bush Administration May Be Doing More than Eavesdropping on Phone Calls – It 
Could be Watching Suspects’ Every Move, SALON, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www.salon.com/ 
news/feature/2007/08/09/domestic_surveillance/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. (quoting Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, Speech at the 2006 GEOINT Symposium 
(Nov. 14, 2006)). 
 4. A common operational picture “provides a means by which analysts, policymakers, 
warfighters, and first responders can rapidly orient to and visualize their environment. It 
displays the required information in a fashion that supports situational awareness and rapid 
decision making.” THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE NATIONAL 
SYSTEM FOR GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE, GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE (GEOINT) BASIC 
DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 1-0, 24 (2006) [hereinafter NGA GEOINT BASIC DOCTRINE], 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/nga/doctrine.pdf. 
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threats such as dams and nuclear facilities.”5 Unfortunately, however, 
some of the U.S. government’s most sophisticated assets and 
capabilities are being underutilized—due in large part to a lack of 
clarity and understanding as to how these resources can appropriately 
be used within the United States.6 According to one study, “[t]he 
ultimate effect is missed opportunities to collect, exploit and 
disseminate domestic information critical to . . . preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from” both manmade and natural 
disasters.7 
Arguably, these opportunities have been lost due to inadequate 
transparency—driven by a culture of secrecy—and an unclear legal 
framework surrounding the domestic use of reconnaissance satellite 
imagery.8 Indeed, from the time of its inception, the domestic 
imagery program has been mired in concern and uncertainty as to its 
legitimacy and precise parameters. This uneasiness stems largely from 
the fact that most of the legal constructs that have been established 
were developed exclusively within the executive branch, leading to 
doubts as to the sufficiency of programmatic oversight. Perhaps 
nothing has highlighted these legal inadequacies more than the 
recent debacle surrounding the National Applications Office 
(NAO)—an office within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) that was designed to facilitate wider domestic use of 
 
 5. John M. Deutch, Director of Central Intelligence, The Environment on the 
Intelligence Agenda, Speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council (July 25, 1996) 
(transcript available at http://www.lawac.org/speech/pre%20sept%2004%20speeches/ 
deutch.html).  
 6. See CIVIL APPLICATIONS COMMITTEE (CAC) BLUE RIBBON STUDY, INDEPENDENT 
STUDY GROUP FINAL REPORT 4–5 (2005) [hereinafter CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY] (“The 
current lack of understanding between the users and providers concerning domestic 
information makes imperative a need for training and education. Domestic users need to know 
and understand what the [Intelligence Community] can and cannot do in supporting their 
requirements.”); Spencer S. Hsu, DHS to Cut Police Access to Spy-Satellite Data: Democrat 
Calls Bush Program ‘Ill-Conceived’, WASH. POST, June 24, 2009, at A8 (“‘I have concerns 
we’re not fully utilizing legal and lawfully authorized capabilities of the U.S. government’” 
quoting Charles Allen, former Undersecretary of the Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis). 
 7. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 5. 
 8. See id. (“The root of the problem is a lack of a clearly articulated comprehensive 
policy on the use of [Intelligence Community] capabilities for domestic needs.”). It is 
important to note at the outset, however, that the author does not contend that reconnaissance 
satellite imagery is being used in violation of applicable law. Instead, this article suggests that 
the lack of clarity and transparency surrounding the existing legal framework for domestic 
imagery limits its use. 
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reconnaissance satellite capabilities, but which closed before it even 
opened because of concerns related to civil liberties and the 
involvement of the Department of Defense (DoD) in civil affairs.9  
In light of this background, this Comment highlights the critical 
role reconnaissance satellite imagery can play in disaster planning and 
response and proposes reforms to address the concerns that currently 
impede its wider use. Specifically, Part II provides background about 
the utility of satellite imagery in domestic disaster prevention and 
response and discusses the comparative advantages of imagery from 
reconnaissance satellites over that provided by commercial sources. 
Part III analyzes the development of the current legal framework 
surrounding the domestic use of reconnaissance satellite assets and 
argues that a lack of transparency and clear legal guidance 
contributes to the underutilization of these vital capabilities within 
the homeland. Part IV explores the recent proposal to create the 
National Applications Office and discusses the challenges to using 
satellite imagery that were exposed by that plan. Part V proposes 
reforms designed to facilitate wider exploitation of reconnaissance 
satellite imagery for disaster prevention and response. Finally, Part VI 
concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Imagery collection via satellites has a long pedigree and 
contributes to the resolution of a wide array of challenges across the 
globe. Its utility extends from monitoring the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons10 to managing refugee camps.11 This Part focuses on the 
value of satellite imagery specifically to disaster prevention and 
response. Beyond explaining satellite imagery’s general utility in the 
disaster context, this Part also highlights the relative advantages of 
using reconnaissance satellites over those operated by commercial 
vendors. 
 
 9. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 6, at A8; see also Turning Spy Satellites on the Homeland: 
The Privacy and Civil Liberties Implications of the National Applications Office: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 35 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of 
Hon. Paul C. Broun, Rep. from Georgia) (“I think you have a real Posse Comitatus problem 
here.”). 
 10. BHUPENDRA JASANI & GOTTHARD STEIN, COMMERCIAL SATELLITE IMAGERY: A 
TACTIC IN NUCLEAR WEAPON DETERRENCE 6–7 (2002). 
 11. JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, SPACE AS A STRATEGIC ASSET 38 (2007). 
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A. Satellite Imagery in the Disaster Context 
Though it is perhaps most recognized for its value after disasters, 
satellite imagery also plays a significant role in disaster prevention. In 
fact, it has proven valuable in responding to virtually every type of 
disaster. For example, analysts can examine imagery for signs of 
topographic faulting to generate tectonic maps12 that can aid 
planners in earthquake zones with land-use decisions. Imagery is also 
useful in demarcating watersheds and potential flood zones.13 
Indeed, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) uses 
satellite imagery to create flood maps that determine risk premiums 
for the National Flood Insurance Program.14 Infrared imaging 
satellite systems can also be used to assess potential volcanic 
activity,15 thereby allowing officials to evacuate vulnerable citizens 
prior to an impending eruption. Finally, satellite imagery has also 
been used to prevent manmade disasters, such as those created by 
terrorist attacks. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
(NGA), for instance, is charged with analyzing satellite imagery in 
support of national security objectives, including the prevention of 
terrorist attacks.16 NGA accomplishes this mission by, among other 
things, analyzing imagery to provide officials with information about 
“vulnerabilities to [the country’s] critical infrastructure and national 
assets” that “can be the basis for planning and responding to threats 
or natural disasters.”17 Current customers of NGA’s domestic 
products include not only federal agencies such as FEMA and the 
 
 12. See, e.g., Sergio R. Galli de Paratesi, Hazards and Disasters: Concepts and Challenges, 
in REMOTE SENSING FOR HAZARD MONITORING AND DISASTER ASSESSMENT: MARINE AND 
COASTAL APPLICATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION 1, 14–15 (Eric Charles Barrett et 
al. eds., 1991). 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 15. 
 14. Press Release, FEMA, New Flood Maps Provide a Snapshot of Current Risks (Nov. 
15, 2002), http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=3754. 
 15. See, e.g., David K. Chester, Overview: Hazard and Risk, in APPLIED 
GEOMORPHOLOGY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 251, 258 T.3 (R. J. Allison ed., 2002). 
 16. See Nat’l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, https://www1.nga.mil/About/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last modified Feb. 20, 2009). NGA is a member of both the DoD and the 
Intelligence Community. Id. 
 17. BERTRAM R. BEAULIEU, THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S ROLE IN HOMELAND DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY 2 (2004), http://www.gisdevelopment.net/proceedings/gita/2004/papers/ 
024.pdf. 
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United States Geological Survey (USGS), but also the National 
Guard and local government officials.18  
As important as satellite imagery is to disaster prevention, its 
utility during disaster relief efforts is immeasurable. After a 
catastrophic disaster, one of the most challenging problems facing 
responders is that the damage is often so overwhelming that it is 
difficult to know where to begin recovery operations.19 Satellite 
imagery can help combat this problem by providing damage 
assessments that guide first responders to areas where their efforts 
will be most fruitful. After an earthquake, for instance, imagery 
analysts can direct search and rescue teams not only to areas with the 
highest concentration of collapsed buildings, but also to those with 
the highest number of potential survivors. More specifically, imagery 
interpreters can provide information to rescuers as to which collapsed 
structures were previously multistory,20 and thus would be more 
likely to have voids necessary for survival after a collapse. Moreover, 
in response to wildfires, analysts can identify hot spots using infrared 
imaging satellites so that firefighters can appropriately direct their 
suppression efforts.21 During floods and tsunamis, satellite imagery 
can be used to assess damage to infrastructure, such as bridges and 
roads, to effectively direct the movement of aid into a disaster area.22 
Finally, in response to manmade disasters such as those created by 
terrorist attacks, satellite imagery can be used to determine the 
extent of destruction. For instance, after the 2001 World Trade 
 
 18. See Bert R. Beaulieu, Security Through the Palanterra, GEOINTELLIGENCE 14, 14 
(July / Aug. 2004), available at http://www.nima.mil/NGASiteContent/StaticFiles/OCR/ 
Geo0704.pdf (“Though it may come as a surprise to those who view NGA as strictly an 
intelligence community and defense combat-support agency . . . NGA has also worked with 
civil government and private-sector partners to support multiple homeland security missions,” 
including natural disasters.). 
 19. See, e.g., Timothy G. Serban, Attending to the Dead: Morgues, Body Identification, 
Accompanying and Blessing the Dead, in DISASTER SPIRITUAL CARE: PRACTICAL CLERGY 
RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL TRAGEDY 245, 253 (Stephen B. 
Roberts & Willard W. C. Ashley, Sr. eds., 2008). 
 20. See generally Keiko Saito et al., Using High-Resolution Satellite Images for Post-
Earthquake Building Damage Assessment: A Study Following the 26 January 2001 Gujarat 
Earthquake, EARTHQUAKE SPECTRA 145, 155–56 (2004). 
 21. See, e.g., Eric S. Kasischke & Nancy H. F. French, Locating and Estimating the Areal 
Extent of Wildfires in Alaskan Boreal Forests Using Multiple-Season AVHRR NDVI Composite 
Data, 51 REMOTE SENSING ENV’T 263 (1995). 
 22. See, e.g., Ahmed Ghobarah et al., The Impact of the 26 December 2004 Earthquake 
and Tsunami on Structures and Infrastructure, 28 ENGINEERING STRUCTURES 312–13 
(2006). 
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Center attacks, NGA used satellite imagery and high-resolution 
elevation data to create models of the damaged area, providing 
responders with better situational awareness with which to carry out 
their missions.23 
B. The Comparative Advantages of Using U.S. Reconnaissance Assets 
Though satellite imagery can thus clearly play a significant role in 
disaster preparation and response, it does not necessarily follow that 
U.S. reconnaissance assets should be used for its collection. While 
historically imagery systems within the United States were 
government-controlled, privatization efforts that began during the 
Reagan Administration have since created a multi-billion dollar 
commercial satellite industry.24 Today, the average person needs 
nothing more than an Internet connection to acquire at least some 
form of satellite imagery. Even NGA—the government agency 
charged with exploiting imagery from reconnaissance satellites—
routinely contracts with commercial imagery providers to acquire 
their products.25 This raises the question of why reconnaissance 
assets should be used at all.  
While reconnaissance satellites were developed to monitor 
activities in foreign areas where the U.S. government could not 
procure on-ground information, their unique capabilities also offer 
advantages over commercial satellites in the domestic disaster 
context. First, though the precise resolution of reconnaissance 
satellites is classified, it clearly surpasses that available from 
commercial sources.26 There is speculation, for example, that the 
 
 23. BEAULIEU, supra note 17, at 7. 
 24. See, e.g., Michael R. Hoversten, U.S. National Security and Government Regulation 
of Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer Space, 50 A.F. L. REV. 253, 253–54 (2001). 
 25. See Press Release, Nat’l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA Awards Contracts for 
Commercial Satellite Synthetic Aperture Radar (COMSAR) Imagery, Data Products, and 
Direct Downlink Services (Dec. 29, 2009), https://www1.nga.mil/Newsroom/Press 
Releases/Press%20Releases/nga0912.pdf; Press Release, Nat’l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
NGA Awards NextView Second Vendor Agreement (Sept. 30, 2004), https:// 
www1.nga.mil/Newsroom/PressReleases/Press%20Releases/NextView20040930.pdf; Press 
Release, Nat’l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA Awards ClearView to ORBIMAGE Inc. 
(Mar. 29, 2004), https://www1.nga.mil/Newsroom/PressReleases/Press%20Releases/ 
03292004.pdf. 
 26. RICHARD A. BEST, JR. & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, SATELLITE SURVEILLANCE: 
DOMESTIC ISSUES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL34421 (June 27, 2008), 
at CRS-4; Joby Warrick, Domestic Use of Spy Satellites to Widen: Law Enforcement Getting New 
Access to Secret Imagery, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2007, at A1. 
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current spatial resolution of reconnaissance satellites is less than four 
inches.27 By contrast, one of the most sophisticated commercial 
satellites is only capable of capturing images at a resolution of sixteen 
inches.28 Further, due to concerns about security, U.S. government 
regulations require that commercial vendors downgrade imagery 
available to the public to a resolution of approximately twenty 
inches.29 While these differences in resolution may seem 
inconsequential, the higher resolution of reconnaissance satellites can 
be critical, for instance, in identifying collapsed buildings or 
damaged infrastructure.30 
Beyond the differences in resolution, another benefit of using 
reconnaissance imagery for disaster planning and response is that it is 
cost-free to the requesting organization.31 Commercial satellite 
imagery, on the other hand, is very expensive. Costs vary widely 
depending on the vendor, the resolution and age of the imagery, and 
the geographic extent of the imaged area. It is not uncommon, 
however, to see prices in the range of $8,000 per image for current 
imagery from high-resolution sensors.32 Because activities related to 
 
 27. Kenneth Silber, Spy Satellites: Still a Few Steps Ahead, SPACE.COM, Sept. 21, 1999, 
http://www.space.com/news/gov_imagery_990921.html. “Spatial resolution refers to the 
smallest spatial element sensed by the satellite. The decision about which type of imagery to 
use will partially be determined by the size of the smallest item that the mapmaker wants to 
detect.” Kass Green, Selecting and Interpreting High-Resolution Images, 98 J. FORESTRY 37 
(2000). 
 28. See Andrea Shalal-Esa, GeoEye Launches High-Resolution Satellite, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0633403420080906. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Saito et al., supra note 20, at 145. To be sure, the differences in resolution likely 
are inconsequential when it comes to providing a large-scale overview of a disaster area. High-
resolution satellite imagery would not be necessary, for example, for monitoring polar ice cap 
melting, deforestation, or desertification. 
 31. See BEST & ELSEA, supra note 26, at CRS-5. Obviously operating the nation’s 
satellite program is expensive, but once launched for reconnaissance purposes, the cost is sunk 
and the satellites can thus be used for multiple purposes without many additional costs. 
Highlighting this point, Charles Allen has expressed, for instance, that “‘we’re not fully 
utilizing legal and lawfully authorized capabilities of the U.S. government, capabilities for 
which U.S. taxpayers paid over decades hundreds of billions of dollars.’” Hsu, supra note 6, at 
A8. The most significant additional cost associated with domestic collection would likely be 
the opportunity cost of diverting analytical resources from overseas intelligence missions to 
interpretation of domestic satellite imagery—a cost that would be incurred whether analysts 
were interpreting imagery from commercial or reconnaissance imagery.  
 32. Erkki Tomppo et al., Working Paper: Forest Resources Assessment 2000: The Role of 
Remote Sensing in Global Forest Assessment 62 (U.N. Food and Agric. Org. [FAO], Forestry 
Dep’t, Working Paper No. 61, 2002).  It is worth noting that as with many commodities on 
the market, as the industry has expanded, costs have gradually declined. 
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disaster preparation and response are often inadequately funded, this 
expense can be prohibitive to those charged with such missions.33 To 
be sure, there are efforts underway, such as the International Charter 
on Space and Major Disasters,34 to combat this problem. But while 
the Charter’s aim is to provide free or low-cost imagery to those 
affected by disasters, the reality is that its impact is somewhat 
limited—at least insofar as U.S. contributions are concerned—by the 
fact that the imagery donated at no-cost by U.S. companies is 
archived rather than newly acquired.35 For disaster response, having 
up-to-date imagery is obviously vital to ascertaining the extent of 
recent damage. 
A third advantage to using reconnaissance rather than 
commercial imaging systems is that since the United States itself 
owns the reconnaissance satellites, the government can target areas 
of special interest during emergencies.36 While it would be good 
business sense for commercial vendors to do the same, the fact is that 
nothing requires them to do so. Moreover, particularly as to 
preventing manmade disasters, the government may be disinclined, 
for security reasons, to reveal the information necessary for 
commercial companies to target specific areas of interest. Admittedly, 
to the extent that the government could simply buy the right to all 
satellite imagery collected by a commercial satellite, general licensing 
agreements between NGA and commercial imagery providers may 
 
 33. See, e.g., John C. Baker & Ray A. Williamson, Satellite Imagery Activism: Sharpening 
the Focus on Tropical Deforestation, 27 SING. J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 4, 8 (2006) (noting, for 
instance, that “it is still relatively expensive for most NGOs and interested individuals to 
acquire timely satellite imagery data of a high spatial . . . resolution”). 
 34. INTERNATIONAL CHARTER SPACE AND MAJOR DISASTERS: CHARTER ON 
COOPERATION TO ACHIEVE THE COORDINATED USE OF SPACE FACILITIES IN THE EVENT OF 
NATURAL OR TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTERS (2000), http://www.disasterscharter.org/web/ 
charter/charter. As its name suggests, this Charter’s aim is to provide low or no-cost imagery 
in response to disasters around the globe, including those within the United States. 
International disaster response is beyond the scope of this Comment; the point here is simply 
to highlight that while the Charter may facilitate acquisition of imagery for U.S. responders 
after a domestic disaster, the efficacy of this process is limited by the fact that U.S. companies 
are primarily contributing aged imagery. 
 35. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, Commercial Satellite Imagery Companies 
Partner with the U.S. Geological Survey in Support of International Charter “Space and Major 
Disasters” (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1647. Newly 
acquired imagery will only be available at “a reduced cost.” Id. 
 36. BEST & ELSEA, supra note 26, at CRS-5. Of course even this capability will be 
limited by the physical capabilities imposed by both the satellite itself and its orbit. 
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limit the impact of privatization.37 Such agreements are expensive, 
though, and may be seen as a wasted expense considering the 
availability of reconnaissance assets. 
Lastly, it is important to briefly note that using U.S. intelligence 
assets may provide other benefits that simply are unavailable from 
private companies. For example, even if the government used 
commercial rather than reconnaissance satellites, NGA analysts 
would still be required to interpret the imagery. Such analytic 
capabilities are important because, as one commentator has aptly 
noted, “unanalyzed collections are practically worthless.”38 
Furthermore, given NGA’s presence within the Intelligence 
Community, its analysts would likely be able to acquire information 
from multiple intelligence disciplines that could be fused to create a 
more comprehensive picture of potential threats.39 This integrated 
capability would simply not be available if intelligence resources were 
not used, and threats may thus go undiscovered until they are carried 
out.  
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR USING RECONNAISSANCE   
ASSETS DOMESTICALLY  
Because the government has long recognized the advantages 
discussed previously, U.S. satellite assets have been used for disaster 
related missions since the 1960s. This Part chronicles the 
development of the domestic use program since that time, focusing 
particularly on the legal structures that emerged as the program 
developed. Most importantly, this Part highlights the fact that a 
robust legal framework for the domestic use of reconnaissance assets 
was, in fact, never fashioned. As explained below, the failure to create 
 
 37. Shortly after commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom, for example, the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA, now NGA) contracted with a commercial 
imagery provider for exclusive access to all high-resolution imagery acquired by the company 
over Afghanistan. Doing so allowed the DoD to train commercial satellites on low priority 
targets while using reconnaissance satellites for higher priority targets. This arrangement came 
at a high cost, however. One report indicates that the contract cost at least $2 million per 
month. David Corn, Their Spy in the Sky: US Hires Space Imaging for Satellite Images of 
Afghanistan, 273 NATION 6 (2001). 
 38. Kneilan K. Novak, Ringing the Bell; Sounding the Alarm: A Proposal for the 
Simultaneous Advancement of Security and Privacy 22–23 (Mar. 2006) (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA445531&Location 
=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf. 
 39. See NGA GEOINT BASIC DOCTRINE, supra note 4, at 10. 
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a legal regime continues to plague efforts to maximize the 
contribution of satellite imagery in the disaster context. 
A. The Development of the Civil Applications Committee 
In 1968, the National Photographic Interpretation Center 
(NPIC)40 convened the first interagency committee meeting to 
facilitate domestic use of reconnaissance satellite imagery.41 
Subsequently, limited domestic collection and analysis commenced, 
including collection related to Hurricane Camille in 1969, the Santa 
Barbara oil spill in 1969, and the Los Angeles earthquake in 1971.42 
In 1974, however, the venture became entangled in “allegations that 
classified U.S. intelligence collections systems were being used to spy 
on U.S. citizens.”43 As a result of these and other similar allegations, 
President Gerald Ford established the President’s Commission on 
CIA activities within the United States and charged its members with 
the task of, among other things, reviewing the domestic use of 
reconnaissance satellite systems.44 
Ultimately, the commission found “no impropriety in permitting 
continued civilian use of [classified overhead] photography.”45 It did, 
 
 40. At the time, NPIC was housed within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 
1996, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Act transferred the CIA’s missions 
and functions related to reconnaissance satellite imagery—including those pertaining to the 
CAC—to NIMA. NIMA was subsequently renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency. See MICHAEL A. TURNER, WHY SECRET INTELLIGENCE FAILS 31 (2005); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, National Imagery and Mapping Agency Established (Oct. 1, 
1996), http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=1055. (While public 
documents from 1996 do not appear to mention NIMA’s role related to the CAC, subsequent 
disclosures make clear that NIMA in fact assumed the CIA’s role. See generally CIVIL 
APPLICATIONS COMMITTEE (2001) [hereinafter CAC FACT SHEET], http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/eprint/cac-fs.pdf.) 
 41. Nat’l Photographic Interpretation Center, memorandum for the record (June16, 
1968), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/05.pdf. The committee 
included representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and 
Interior, as well as members from the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and 
NPIC. Id. See also JEFFERY T. RICHELSON, U.S. RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES: DOMESTIC 
TARGETS, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE ELECTRONIC BRIEFING BOOK (2008), http://www. 
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/index.htm. 
 42. See Nat’l Photographic Interpretation Center, memorandum for the record (May 8, 
1973), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/12.pdf. 
 43. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 6. 
 44. See, e.g., id. 
 45. Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Secretary of Interior, the U.S. 
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however, recommend the creation of an independent “interagency 
committee of Federal civil agencies to facilitate appropriate use of 
[satellite] technology and allay concerns about the potential for 
improper use of intelligence assets for domestic purposes.”46 
Accordingly, in 1975, the Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
signed a joint memorandum creating the Civil Applications 
Committee (CAC).47  
From its inception, the CAC’s mission was to “act as the 
interface between civilian agencies and intelligence collectors” and 
“oversee civilian agency uses of classified photography in a manner 
designed to avoid any concerns that domestic photographic coverage 
is being used improperly.”48 The charter called for a representative 
from the Department of the Interior (DOI) to chair the committee, 
and expressly mandated membership of the Departments of 
Agriculture and Commerce, NASA, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE), and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).49 The DCI was also required to appoint a representative to 
serve ex officio on the committee in order to act as a liaison to the 
Intelligence Community.50 
Though the classified nature of issues surrounding the CAC 
makes it difficult to determine precisely how domestic collection 
initially operated, recently declassified documents do provide some 
insight into the process. One document that is especially significant 
concerns the authority of the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO)—the agency that builds and operates the country’s 
reconnaissance satellites51—to use the systems to collect imagery 
within the United States. The memo, written in response to a 
presidential executive order prohibiting domestic collection against 
 
Secretary of Agriculture, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, the NASA Administrator, the EPA 
Administrator, and the Army Chief of Engineers (Oct. 3, 1975), http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/18.pdf. 
 46. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 7. 
 47. See BEST & ELSEA, supra note 26, at CRS-2; Kissinger, supra note 45.  
 48. Kissinger, supra note 45. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. The CAC was also vested with authority to expand its membership at its own 
discretion. 
 51. See Nat’l Reconnaissance Office, http://www.nro.gov/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
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U.S. persons,52 discussed the inadvertent collection of data obtained 
while the satellites were engaged in otherwise “legitimate” purposes 
such as disaster relief.53 Because reconnaissance systems were in fact 
incidentally collecting data against U.S. persons during disaster relief 
operations, they technically violated the executive order. Still, the 
internal NRO memo indicated that the Director of the NRO was 
nevertheless authorized to continue domestic satellite imaging, so 
long as it was pursued in accordance with the “spirit and intent” of 
the order.54 Ensuing NRO policy directives indicated that 
reconnaissance imagery of U.S. territory “should be minimized and 
obtained only in response to formal, documented requirements” of 
the CAC, and that “data inadvertently obtained on U.S. persons or 
organizations [should] not be used for any purposes and [should] be 
destroyed at the earliest practical time.”55 
Notwithstanding these directives, concern understandably 
persisted regarding the legality of operations pursued via the CAC. 
In 1978, for example, a senior official within the NRO ordered his 
staff to conduct a study as to the legitimacy of procedures which, in 
effect, called for civilian agencies acquiring classified imagery via the 
CAC to “attest[] to the propriety of their [own] collection 
requirements.”56 In fact, he noted that top administration officials, 
including the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the 
NRO were “potentially in a vulnerable position with respect to this 
issue,” largely because of a lack of oversight within Congress or by 
senior executive officials.57 While the results of the study are not 
entirely clear, the official did note in a subsequent memo to the CIA 
chief responsible for exploiting domestic imagery that “[i]t 
 
 52. See Exec. Order 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1977), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1977). 
 53. The Nat’l Sec. Archive, Authority for the National Reconnaissance Program 
Domestic Satellite Reconnaissance Activities, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB229/23.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Memorandum from Charles W. Cook, NRO Deputy Director, to various NRO 
program managers, date unknown, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB229/24.pdf; see also NRO memorandum for General Kulpa and Mr. Dirks (May 28, 
1976), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/25.pdf. It should also be 
noted that other limited domestic collection was permitted for satellite engineering and testing 
purposes. Id. 
 56. Memorandum from William L. Shields, NRO Staff Director, to Col. Frederick L. 
Hoffman, U.S. Air Force (Jan. 26, 1978), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB229/28b.pdf. 
 57. Id. 
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appear[ed] unclear whether a current, authoritative legal approach 
for such domestic use of national intelligence assets exist[ed].”58 
Though he proposed pursuing programmatic approval from the 
Attorney General,59 there is no public record indicating that anyone 
followed this recommendation. 
B. The Operations of the Civil Applications Committee 
Despite this unsettled legal framework, CAC operations thrived 
during the 1980s and 1990s.60 By 2005, the CAC was holding 
monthly meetings with members from eleven governmental 
departments and independent agencies, including the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and FEMA.61 As for its current 
operational functions, the CAC is today charged with oversight 
duties “includ[ing] disseminating information to Federal users on 
policies related to the proper nonintelligence use of the [collected] 
data and the protection of intelligence sources and materials.”62 The 
CAC also “ensures that domestic imagery requirements are 
submitted and processed according to established policies and 
procedures.”63 While those policies and procedures are evidently 
contained in classified policy directives,64 there have been a few 
public disclosures about the process. 
 According to NGA directives, for example, requests for the 
domestic use of reconnaissance satellites “are processed and 
 
 58. Memorandum from William L. Shields, NRO Staff Director, to COMIREX 
chairman (Feb. 15, 1978), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/29.pdf. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Projects included, for example, floodplain mapping for FEMA, bilge oil discharge 
monitoring for the U.S. Coast Guard, hazardous waste site characterization for the 
Department of Energy, and wetlands mapping, wildfire detection, and volcanic activity 
monitoring for the DOI. See GOVERNMENT APPLICATIONS TASK FORCE (GATF), PILOT 
PROJECT SUMMARY (1996), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/ 
34.pdf; Memorandum of Agreement for Cooperation in Wildland Fire Detection, Volcanic 
Activity Monitoring, and Volcanic Ash Cloud Tracking Between the Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense, Space and the U.S. Geological Survey (Apr. 30, 1997), http://www.gwu.edu/ 
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB229/35.pdf. 
 61. See CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 7; CAC FACT SHEET, supra note 
40, at 2. 
 62. CAC FACT SHEET, supra note 40, at 1. 
 63. Id. (emphasis added). 
 64. See Christopher M. Petras, “Eyes” on Freedom—A View of the Law Governing 
Military Use of Satellite Reconnaissance in U.S. Homeland Defense, 31 J. SPACE L. 81, 95 n.61 
(2005) (explaining that NIMA’s imagery policy related to domestic imagery collection is 
classified). 
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approved under the authority of the DCI.”65 Before such collections 
commence, NGA requires the requestor to fill out a Proper Use 
Memorandum (PUM).66 In testimony before Congress, Daniel W. 
Sutherland, an officer within DHS’s Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Office, explained that a PUM is 
a memorandum between the requesting agency and NGA outlining 
the parameters of permissible requests. A PUM includes the 
requesting agency’s authorized mission permitting use of such 
information, a description of the intended use of the domestic 
imagery, who will exploit the domestic imagery, who will receive 
the domestic imagery and derived products, storage and protection 
of the imagery, and certification by an appropriate official of the 
lawfulness and validity of the request.67 
Sutherland further explained that prior to approval, NGA legal 
and policy experts review all submissions to ensure compliance with 
applicable law.68 
C. A Programmatic Review of the Civil Applications Committee 
Unfortunately, little more is publicly known about how the CAC 
works, and even that which is now known would likely have 
remained undisclosed if not for DHS efforts, beginning in 2005, to 
create an office known as the National Applications Office (NAO).69 
The vision of the NAO was that it would promote wider distribution 
of domestic imagery from reconnaissance satellite assets for civil, 
national security, and law enforcement purposes.70 The office’s 
genesis sprang from an independent study chartered by the Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI)71 and the Director of the USGS to 
 
 65. Id. at 101. Given the elimination of the DCI, this authority likely currently rests 
with the Director of National Intelligence. See infra note 71. 
 66. See Hearing, supra note 9, at 13 (statement of Daniel W. Sutherland, Officer, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties). 
 67. Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Congressional hearings regarding the NAO’s operations exposed many details that 
had not previously been publicly acknowledged. 
 70. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: National Applications Office 
(Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1187188414685.shtm. 
 71. After 9/11, with the passage of the Intelligence Reform Act, the DNI essentially 
subsumed the duties of the DCI. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 1081, 118 Stat. 3696 (codified in scattered sections of 50 
U.S.C.) (“Any reference to the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of the Central 
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review the “operation and future role” of the CAC.72 These officials 
felt the study was necessary in light of the fact that “opportunities to 
better protect the nation” were being missed because of outdated 
and unclear legal guidance.73 
In its findings, the study group noted that the policy 
surrounding domestic use of reconnaissance imagery “is anchored in 
a complex web of law, National Security Policy and Presidential 
executive orders, DNI/DCI and DOD Directives, Interagency 
Agreements, and imagery-specific policy developed, coordinated, 
promulgated and maintained by” NGA.74 The group felt that such a 
framework served to “discourage rather than encourage use by 
domestic users” since the “legal regime governing the use of 
[Intelligence Community] capabilities domestically is unsettled.”75 
And though the study was largely undertaken to examine national 
security and law enforcement applications, the group emphasized 
that the “missed opportunities to collect, exploit and disseminate 
domestic information” extended even to “preparing for, responding 
to, and recovering from” manmade and natural disasters.76 
Beyond the lack of clear legal guidance, the study also 
highlighted that the culture of secrecy within the Intelligence 
Community perpetuated the problem, and even if legal guidelines 
were clearer, there was nevertheless a “cultural aversion toward 
collection of domestic imagery.”77 Although this environment has 
not received a great deal of attention as specifically related to the 
satellite reconnaissance community, it has been well documented 
within the Intelligence Community generally.78 One commentator, 
for instance, has fittingly observed that apprehensions regarding 
“secrecy and the protection of information can lead to increasing 
 
Intelligence Agency in the Director’s capacity as the head of the intelligence community . . . 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the Director of National Intelligence.”).   
 72. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 4. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 33. 
 75. Id. at 5, 18; see also id. at 29 (“[A]s a result of presentations by lawyers from the 
intelligence community, the ISG was advised of the uncertainty and conflicting opinions 
regarding lawful application and use of imagery.”). 
 76. Id. at 5. 
 77. Id. at 32–33. 
 78. This has been especially true in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, given the fact 
that information-sharing issues were widely cited as a reason for the government’s failure to 
prevent the attacks against the United States. See, e.g., John D. Podesta, Shadow Creep: 
Government Secrecy Since 9/11, 2002 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 361, 362–63 (2002).  
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risk-aversion and loss-aversion. Prudent regulations and sensible 
norms initially established to guard against worse-case scenarios can 
suffer from a kind of ‘normative drift’—pretty soon, an old rule like 
‘if in doubt, classify’ becomes the default rule ‘always classify.’”79 As 
pertaining to reconnaissance satellite imagery, the CAC study group 
noted that this culture has led to a general “across-the-board 
application of a SECRET level marking in an effort to protect 
sources and methods and serve as a hedge against uncertainty.”80 
While there are definitely exceptions to this classification scheme, the 
fact that they are exceptions is indicative of the secretive culture 
within the community that discourages the release of imagery, even 
for disaster related purposes.  
In light of this culture of secrecy and the aforementioned legal 
complexities surrounding the domestic use of satellite imagery, the 
study group ultimately concluded that “significant change is needed 
in policy regimes regulating domestic use of [Intelligence 
Community] capabilities.”81 The group thus recommended a 
comprehensive review of all laws, policies, and practices governing 
domestic satellite collection.82 Noting that “the same concerns which 
gave rise to the CAC are likely to emerge again,” the group also 
proposed formation of a Domestic Applications Office (DAO) within 
DHS to “ensure the capabilities of the [Intelligence Community] are 
used lawfully and with full consideration of the rights of U.S. 
persons.”83 
IV. THE NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE 
While it is unclear what efforts—if any—were made toward the 
recommendation of clarifying the legal framework surrounding 
domestic satellite collection, work began almost immediately to 
establish the DAO. Although he had only received the study group’s 
report in December of 2005, by March of 2006, DHS Secretary 
Michael Chertoff sent a letter to DNI John Negroponte calling for 
 
 79. Roderick M. Kramer, A Failure to Communicate: 9/11 and the Tragedy of the 
Informational Commons, 8 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 397, 405 (2005).  
 80. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 34. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 15, 30–31.  
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the transition of all CAC functions to the DAO within sixty days.84 
The DNI moved slightly more deliberatively, but by May of 2007, 
Negroponte had designated DHS as the executive agent of what 
had, along the way, become the National Applications Office 
(NAO).85 This Part discusses the effort to create the NAO specifically 
as related to the problems it revealed with the government’s 
domestic imagery collection strategy.  
A. Congress Finally Gets Involved in Domestic Imagery Collection 
The first public statement about the NAO was made by DHS in 
August of 2007, less than two months before the office was slated to 
open.86 Perhaps not coincidentally, DHS’s announcement came 
while Congress was on its August recess.87 When Congress 
reconvened in September, Representative Bennie Thompson, the 
Chairman for the House Committee on Homeland Security, 
immediately commenced hearings to discuss the NAO.88 Thompson 
made clear that despite the nearly two-year effort to establish the 
NAO, no one within either DHS or the DNI’s office had ever 
informed the Committee on Homeland Security about the 
 
 84. Memorandum from Michael Chertoff, DHS Secretary, to Ambassador John D. 
Negroponte, DNI (Mar. 14, 2001), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB229/41.pdf. It is hard to overlook how much DHS stood to gain from this 
arrangement. Not only did the establishment of the DAO require transfer of the CAC’s 
functions (and staff) from the DNI to DHS, the study group had also recommended that the 
DNI continue to fund the program. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 4. It can be 
argued that at least part of the reason for that proposal was that it would have permitted the 
DAO/NAO to remain somewhat more independent. The fact remains, though, that DHS 
appeared to have little to lose with this venture, which may explain the haste (and concomitant 
lack of foresight) with which the program proceeded. 
 85. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, LETTER REPORT: 
DHS NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE PRIVACY STEWARDSHIP (REDACTED) OIG REPORT 
08-35, at 2 (2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIGr_08-35_Apr08.pdf. 
Though there is evidently no public information regarding the name change, the explanation 
for it does not require much imagination. News of the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program, 
which was more colloquially known as the “domestic spying program,” broke in December of 
2005. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. The change from Domestic Applications Office to National 
Applications Office likely ensued so as to avoid any perceived affiliation between the two 
programs. 
 86. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: National Applications 
Office (Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1187188414685.shtm. 
 87. Hearing, supra note 9, at 1. 
 88. Id. 
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program.89 Indeed, he chided the senior DHS representative during 
the hearings for the fact that the committee had to learn about the 
NAO from the Wall Street Journal and noted that “there was no 
briefing, no hearing, no phone call from anyone [within DHS] to 
inform any member of this committee of why, how, or when satellite 
imagery would be shared” with civil agencies.90  
1. DHS notice to Congress  
To put it mildly, the hearings were a disaster for the NAO. The 
fact that DHS had not informed the committee about the program 
was the first source of contention. One congressman noted, for 
example, that “if we are to be an effective oversight committee . . . it 
is essential that we be brought in at the start, not find out about 
[such programs] from press reports after the fact.”91 Less generously, 
another committee member compared the NAO to the National 
Security Agency’s Terrorist Surveillance Program.92 “[W]e are 
dealing in context here,” said Representative Jane Harman, “[a]nd 
the context is . . . that this administration, post 9/11, rolled out the 
terrorist surveillance program, decided unilaterally . . . and has been 
making security policy in the executive branch without full regard for 
the laws that Congress has passed.”93 Later, she stated that though 
she and the rest of Congress had been “rolled” on the terrorist 
surveillance program, she did not intend “to get rolled again.”94  
2. Failure in planning  
More substantively, DHS representatives faced intense criticism 
for failing to fully consider the legal ramifications of the NAO before 
its launch. One of the major sources of concern was that the NAO 
planned to expand the use of domestic satellite imaging to include 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 3 (statement of Hon. Peter T. King, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec.). 
 92. Id. at 23 (statement of Hon. Jane Harman, Member, H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec.). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 59. Likewise, a witness adverse to the creation of the NAO noted that 
Congress should indeed have been offended that after two years of DHS work to establish the 
program, “and on the eve of its implementation,” the press had to “discover this revolutionary 
plan.” Id. at 56 (statement of Lisa Graves, Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies Deputy Director). 
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not only civil applications, such as disaster planning and relief, but 
also national security and law enforcement collection. From the 
perspective of most committee members, this posed significant 
problems related to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)95 and the Fourth 
Amendment.96  
a. The Posse Comitatus Act. In general terms, the PCA prohibits 
the U.S. military from directly participating in law enforcement 
activities, except in certain exceptional circumstances.97 The Act 
reflects a “long tradition of suspicion and hostility toward the use of 
military forces for domestic purposes.”98 In the leading case 
concerning the PCA, United States v. Red Feather, the court 
explained that impermissible direct participation in law enforcement 
includes such activities as “arrest; seizure of evidence; search of a 
person; search of a building; investigation of crime; interviewing 
witnesses; pursuit of an escaped civilian prisoner; search of an area for 
a suspect and other like activities.”99 By contrast, permissible passive 
involvement includes such activities as aerial reconnaissance, offering 
advice about operational planning, and delivery of military 
equipment and supplies for training purposes.100 
As pertaining to the NAO, certain members of the Committee 
for Homeland Security apparently believed that “[u]sing [the] 
Department of Defense” in any manner for NAO law enforcement 
operations would, in and of itself, be a violation of the PCA.101 This 
perception was perhaps perpetuated by the testimony of a witness 
adverse to the NAO who noted that “[t]hese are the Department of 
Defense satellites. These offices are within the Department of 
 
 95. 18 U.S.C. §1385; see, e.g., Hearing, supra note 9, at 23, 35, 41–42, 46–47, 50, 55–
61. 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 1385; see also The Posse Comitatus Act, U.S. N. Command, 
http://www.northcom.mil/About/history_education/posse.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
While the Act itself encompasses only the Army and Air Force, DoD directives have made the 
prohibition applicable to the Navy and Marine Corps. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, THE POSSE 
COMITATUS ACT AND RELATED MATTERS: A SKETCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
REPORT RS20590 (June 6, 2005), at CRS-4.  
 98. Bisonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1389 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 99. 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.C. S.D. 1975). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Hearing, supra note 9, at 42 (statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, H. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec.). 
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Defense. This is the military.”102 When asked about the implications 
of the PCA on the operations of the NAO, DHS officials suggested 
that there would be no violation because “NGA can provide indirect 
support.”103 The committee members, however, remained 
unpersuaded, with one suggesting bluntly that she did not find the 
government’s response to the PCA issues at all satisfactory.104 
b. The Fourth Amendment. In addition to the PCA issues, the 
committee had a fundamental problem with the fact that the NAO’s 
operations, especially those related to law enforcement, would 
potentially violate the Fourth Amendment.105 The Fourth 
Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”106 During the 
hearings, one witness explained that the domestic use of satellite 
imagery was such an unreasonable search that it was essentially “like 
Big Brother in the Sky.”107 As for the committee, one member noted 
that the “[F]ourth [A]mendment really is a kind of cornerstone, if 
you will, for the home being the castle. If we allow the unfettered 
access by way of satellite technology, which is unchartered space for 
us, we really don’t know exactly where this will end.”108 Another 
committee member pointed out that the Supreme Court had 
suggested in dicta that satellite surveillance might be 
unconstitutional without a warrant.109 Though the DHS witnesses 
 
 102. Id. at 44 (statement of Barry Steinhardt, Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union Program on Technology and Liberty). Another witness went further, suggesting that 
the Red Feather decision interpreted the PCA too narrowly. In her estimation, the PCA was 
designed not only to prohibit aggressive assistance by the armed forces, but all military 
intervention in domestic affairs. Id. at 55 (statement of Lisa Graves, Center for Nat’l Sec. 
Studies Deputy Director). 
 103. Id. at 42 (statement of Hugo Teufel, III, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec.) (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 24 (statement of Hon. Jane Harman, Member, H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec.). 
 105. Id. at 26 (statement of Hon. Al Green, Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.). 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 107. Hearing, supra note 9, at 50 (statement of Lisa Graves, Center for Nat’l Sec. Studies 
Deputy Director). 
 108. Id. at 26 (statement of Hon. Al Green, Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.). 
 109. Id. at 28 (statement of Hon. Daniel E. Lungren, Member, H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec.) (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) 
(“[S]urveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not 
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were able to certify that the NAO would not permit penetration of 
buildings and homes,110 when specifically asked if there were any 
U.S. Supreme Court cases directly pertaining to the NAO’s planned 
operations, they could only respond that they were still 
“coordinating [their] thoughts” on the matter.111 
c. Statutory schemes and congressional oversight. In an attempt to 
alleviate some of the committee’s concern, DHS officials testified 
that reconnaissance satellite imagery had “been used for decades 
lawfully and appropriately to support a variety of domestic uses by 
the U.S. Government’s scientific, security, and law enforcement 
agencies.”112 They asserted that the NAO would actually provide 
more oversight for such collection, because approval authority would 
no longer be concentrated within NGA.113 Specifically, though NGA 
would continue to play an integral role in the approval process, they 
explained that the NAO would also be “subject to direct oversight 
by privacy and civil liberties offices within both” DHS and ODNI.114 
Additionally, the NAO would even “have its own legal advisor.”115 
DHS witnesses further explained that the process would be subject 
to the House and Senate Intelligence Oversight Committees and 
that it would comply with all applicable laws.116 Ultimately, DHS saw 
the development of the NAO as nothing more than an expansion of 
 
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally 
prescribed [sic] absent a warrant.”)). 
 110. See id. at 29 (statement of Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). 
 111. Id. at 21 (statement of Daniel W. Sutherland, Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties). 
 112. Id. at 5 (statement of Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). 
 113. Id. at 15 (statement of Hugo Teufel, III, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec.). 
 114. Id. at 9 (statement of Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). 
 115. Id. (statement of Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). 
 116. Id. These included “the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, and . . . the Privacy Act.” Id. at 19. Exec. Order N. 12,333, 
46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 8, 1981) (revoking Exec. Order 12,036); Exec. Order No. 12,036, 
43 Fed. Reg. 3,674 (Jan. 24, 1978) (superseding Exec. Order 11,905). 
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its then-existing customer base and a means of streamlining an 
otherwise ad hoc process.117  
In response, the committee pressed for more details, which 
simply were not forthcoming. Representative Harman, for instance, 
stated that “just telling us that [existing laws] cover this program is 
not telling me anything.”118 Instead, she “want[ed] to see the legal 
document[s] that put[] the clear, bright legal framework around” 
the NAO.119 Another committee member, Representative Al Green, 
expressed concern that too much power related to satellite imagery 
had been concentrated in the executive branch.120 “The 
[C]onstitution requires a broader remedy that envisions the judiciary 
being a part of something as pervasive as what we are capable of 
doing with the satellites.”121 Indeed, Green was not even persuaded 
that previous activities related to domestic collection were 
constitutional.122 He raised the question of why “something 
comparable to what FISA was envisioned to be” could not be used 
as a clearinghouse for domestic collection requests.123  
d. The beginning of the end. Though one committee member 
expressed that the NAO was merely consolidating “what has been 
done in an ad hoc way in a variety of ways over the past 30 years,” 
such statements of support were rare.124 In the end, the committee 
called for a moratorium on the opening of the NAO until DHS 
could show that adequate legal frameworks were in place to ensure 
 
 117. Id. at 20 (statement of Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). 
 118. Id. at 23 (statement of Hon. Jane Harman, Member, H. Comm. on Homeland 
Sec.). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 26 (statement of Hon. Al Green, Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 27. FISA is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was enacted in 
1978 as an attempt to balance Fourth Amendment rights against the need to conduct 
domestic national security intelligence collection. FISA required that the executive branch 
(more precisely, the president, acting through the attorney general) obtain an order from the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before conducting a search against U.S. 
persons for foreign intelligence purposes. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804–05 (1978). By its terms, FISA 
originally only applied to electronic surveillance, though it has since been extended to physical 
searches for foreign intelligence purposes. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–12 (1978); 50 U.S.C. § 1822 
(2008).  
 124. Hearing, supra note 9, at 3–4 (statement of Hon. Peter T. King, Ranking Member, 
H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.). 
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that “military spy satellites do not become the ‘Big Brother in the 
Sky’ that some in the privacy and civil liberties community have 
described.”125 Subsequently, Congress passed legislation prohibiting 
“funds from being made available to commence operations of the 
NAO” until DHS certified that the program would be compliant 
with existing laws, and until that certification was thereafter reviewed 
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).126 While DHS 
certified the program to Congress in April of 2008, the GAO review 
released in November of 2008 was likely the death knell for the 
office.127 In its very first finding, the GAO review succinctly reported 
that DHS “has not yet fully addressed all outstanding issues 
regarding how the planned operations of the NAO . . . are to comply 
with legal requirements.”128 In June of 2009, DHS Secretary Janet 
Napolitano announced the closure of the NAO.129 
B. Failing to Learn from the NAO Experience 
Admittedly, much of the anxiety surrounding the NAO was 
based on the DHS’s plan to extend domestic satellite collection to 
national security and law enforcement applications. Nevertheless, as 
Representative Green pointed out during the NAO hearings, the 
events surrounding the NAO debacle also exposed fundamental and 
persistent concerns regarding the domestic use of reconnaissance 
satellites and raised questions about the legitimacy of using them 
even for civil users within FEMA and state and local governments. 
Indeed, as plans to establish the NAO evolved, the CAC study 
group’s observation regarding the unsettled “legal regime governing 
 
 125. BEST & ELSEA, supra note 26, at CRS-10 (quoting letter from Hon. Bennie G. 
Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., to Hon. David E. Price, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Homeland Sec., Comm. on Appropriations and Hon. Harold Rogers, Ranking 
Member, Subcomm. on Homeland Sec., Comm. on Appropriations) (Sept. 26, 2007). See also 
Letter from Hon. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., to Hon. 
Michael Chertoff, DHS Secretary, and Charles Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 6, 2007), 
http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070907154522-02923.pdf.  
 126. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE 
CERTIFICATION REVIEW, GAO-09-105R (Nov. 6, 2008), at 2. 
 127. See id. at 3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces 
Decision to End National Applications Office Program (June 23, 2009), http:// 
www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1245785980174.shtm. 
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the use of [Intelligence Community] capabilities domestically” 
seemed especially prescient.130 
These problems arguably had their root in the origins of the 
program and the fact that it was created, not by any legislative 
action, but rather by intra-executive memoranda and policy 
directives. As outlined above, this legal framework—such as it was—
raised flags from the beginning as to the legitimacy of the effort.131 
Moreover, while the imagery itself was understandably safeguarded 
from public disclosure, the lack of transparency as to the policies and 
procedures governing domestic imaging made analogies to the 
NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program all too easy to adopt. It also 
likely contributed to an incomplete understanding, both within the 
Intelligence Community and Congress, as to how the program fit 
within larger constitutional and statutory schemes such as the Fourth 
Amendment and the Posse Comitatus Act. Finally, the lack of clear 
legal guidance related to domestic imagery reinforced the culture of 
secrecy within the Intelligence Community and made analysts even 
more risk averse in decisions about releasing imagery for fear that 
they would be exceeding legal authorization. Given this context, it 
was no surprise that Congress so adamantly opposed efforts to 
establish the NAO.  
But while efforts to create the office were perhaps appropriately 
stymied, the unfortunate result has been that since its closure, the 
government has simply returned to the status quo. Shortly after the 
NAO hearings, Representative Thompson sent a letter to DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff explaining that “[b]ifurcating the NAO 
into ‘easy to do’ domains and a ‘hard to do’ law enforcement 
domain is not an option.”132 Thompson believed the legal framework 
for all domestic imagery collection, whether for disaster planning or 
law enforcement, “should be completed as a seamless package so 
privacy and civil liberties are approached holistically and not 
haphazardly.”133 While there is certainly merit to this argument,134 
 
 130. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 132. Letter from Hon. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 
to Hon. Michael Chertoff, DHS Secretary (Apr. 7, 2008), http://homeland.house.gov/ 
SiteDocuments/20080407134422-36588.PDF. 
 133. Id. 
 134. In addition to facilitating a comprehensive strategy for domestic imagery collection, 
for example, it would minimize the duplication of effort inherent in a bifurcated system. See, 
e.g., CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 45. 
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the government’s inability to effectively address the “hard to do” 
aspects of the NAO led to abandonment of efforts to clarify legal 
standards for even the “easy to do” domestic collections. 
Consequently, the energy poured into exposing the problems with 
the domestic satellite collection program—from the independent 
study group to the congressional hearings—has essentially been 
wasted. The program is, therefore, once again on a course 
encouraging missed “opportunities to better protect the nation.”135  
V. PROPOSED REFORMS 
Several reforms are necessary to interrupt this pattern of wasted 
opportunities. First, in order to avoid abuses while still taking full 
advantage of satellite capabilities, Congress should develop an 
adequate governance structure under which a domestic collection 
program can operate. Further, this structure must be built on a more 
rigorous statutory framework outlining the parameters by which 
domestic imagery can be collected. Also, given the inherent lack of 
public transparency with certain aspects of this program, Congress 
must ensure that it is properly fulfilling its intelligence oversight 
responsibilities. Each of these proposals is discussed in turn.  
A. Governance of the Domestic Imaging Program 
Despite Representative Thompson’s suggestion that bifurcation 
of the domestic satellite collection program into two domains or 
offices was not an option, such a structure in reality seems to be the 
most prudent course of action. More specifically, to the extent that 
they can be conducted lawfully at all, law enforcement operations 
ought to be managed in an office separate and distinct from the 
office managing collections for disaster planning and response. The 
primary rationale for this is that once the DoD engages in satellite 
collection for law enforcement purposes, the potential for Posse 
Comitatus Act and Fourth Amendment violations increases 
exponentially. On the other hand, when imagery collection is limited 
to civil applications, these issues, as Thompson suggested, are simply 
easier to address. 
 
 135. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 4. 
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1. The Posse Comitatus Act 
Though some members of Congress appear to have been 
confused about the dictates of the PCA, careful analysis of the Act 
suggests that bifurcation is necessary to comply with its prescribed 
dictates. More to the point, there does not appear to be a PCA 
violation for domestic imagery confined strictly to disaster 
preparation and response. Conversely, involving the military in 
domestic satellite collection for law enforcement purposes may 
indeed present a violation. 
First, the PCA would clearly not be implicated if domestic 
satellite collection were strictly constrained to disaster planning and 
response. By its terms, the PCA only limits military participation in 
law enforcement activities.136 While it is conceivable that federal 
troops could be requested for such law enforcement activities as 
quelling post-disaster riots or looting, scholars have suggested that 
these sorts of activities are usually less pervasive than reports might 
otherwise suggest.137 Moreover, even if riots and looting were in fact 
to occur, given the relatively isolated and sporadic nature of such 
incidences, satellite imagery would not likely be helpful in subduing 
them. Even in the unlikely event that the military did rely on satellite 
imagery for such law enforcement operations, Red Feather suggests 
that any related PCA violation in this scenario would be for the 
manner in which the troops were used, rather than for use of DoD 
imagery.138 
The calculus might change, however, if a unified collection 
strategy, including those related to law enforcement operations, were 
pursued. Red Feather clearly established that the PCA only prohibits 
the military from directly participating in law enforcement 
activities.139 Thus, while using DoD assets to collect the imagery 
would not, in and of itself, violate the PCA, there are arguably 
 
 136. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2010).  
 137. See, e.g., Thomas E. Drabek & David A. McEntire, Emergent Phenomena and the 
Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends and Opportunities from the Research Literature, 12 
DISASTER PREVENTION & MGMT. 97, 98–99 (2003). 
 138. It might be possible to extend this argument to a suggestion that since it would be 
the DoD providing satellite imagery to these military personnel, the PCA is in fact implicated. 
While this is explored in more detail in the following paragraph, suffice it to say that 
complications in such an unlikely scenario only appear to arise if military analysts are 
interpreting the imagery in an effort to seize evidence or conduct a search. 
 139. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.C.S.D. 1975). 
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related activities that might. For example, were military analysts to 
interpret imagery collected for law enforcement operations, there 
may in fact be a PCA violation.140 The disposition of such a case 
would depend on whether a court viewed this effort simply as aerial 
reconnaissance—which Red Feather deemed indirect activity—or as a 
search for or seizure of evidence—which Red Feather said 
constituted direct involvement.141 Clearly if the court saw satellite 
imagery collection as a seizure of evidence or a search, the activity 
would violate the PCA.142  
2. The Fourth Amendment  
Raising the issue of searches also brings to the forefront concerns 
related to the Fourth Amendment. As with the PCA, thorough 
scrutiny of the Fourth Amendment’s application to domestic imagery 
collection in the disaster context suggests that bifurcation of the 
nation’s domestic satellite collection strategy is necessary. In 
particular, while there are arguably no violations when 
reconnaissance satellites are used for disaster related missions, their 
use in the law enforcement context presents potential violations that 
may be entirely insurmountable. 
Though such a case has never been adjudicated, it seems unlikely 
that domestic imagery collection confined strictly to disaster 
planning and response would be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. This assertion rests on the fact that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has established that “the traditional requirement of a warrant 
based on probable cause is not well-suited to searches for purposes” 
 
 140. This is not simply an academic exercise. Though data related to NGA’s workforce is 
classified, the agency is known to have “sizable numbers of active duty military personnel 
assigned” to it. BEST & ELSEA, supra note 26, at CRS-13. Moreover, similar issues may even 
apply to non-military analysts. This is because DoD directives indicate that even civilian 
employees of the DoD are subject to the PCA if they are “under the direct command and 
control of a military officer.” Dep’t of Defense Directive 5525.5 ¶ E4.2.3 (Dec. 20, 1989), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/552505p.pdf. Though the 
phrase “direct command” is obviously subject to interpretation, it is significant that since its 
creation in 1996, NGA has only had one civilian director. THE NAT’L GEOSPATIAL-
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HISTORICAL HANDBOOK OF NGA LEADERS: OFFICE OF THE NGA 
HISTORIAN 58 (2008), https://www1.nga.mil/About/OurHistory/Documents/leaders.pdf. 
 141. See Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 925. 
 142. For a more thorough discussion as to whether satellite imagery collection for law 
enforcement purposes constitutes a search, see infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. 
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such as public safety.143 Instead, in such “special needs” cases,144 the 
Court relies on a reasonableness test that balances the interests at 
stake to determine what precautions are appropriate.145 As specifically 
applied to domestic disaster related reconnaissance imagery, an 
adjudicating court would thus weigh the value to be gained by using 
the imagery against any privacy interest that could potentially be 
invaded. Given that any personal invasion that might occur would be 
minimal, a court is likely to determine that it is dwarfed by the public 
safety interest. A court would, therefore, probably determine that 
only minimal safeguards are required for such strictly defined 
operations.146 Since the government evidently already has safeguards 
and minimization procedures in place,147 a court would likely reach 
the conclusion that domestic imagery collection for disasters does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
Conversely, using reconnaissance satellites for domestic imagery 
collection related to law enforcement and national security missions 
falls into the “hard to do” domain mentioned by Representative 
Thompson. This is essentially because “if the purpose of the search is 
simply to obtain evidence for purposes of criminal law enforcement, 
then probable cause and a warrant are presumptively required.”148 
While the executive would likely argue that satellite imagery 
collection does not constitute a search, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
intimated otherwise. Specifically, in Dow Chemical v. United States, 
the Court noted that the use of “highly sophisticated surveillance 
equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite 
technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”149 
And more generally, the Court held in Kyllo v. United States that the 
 
 143. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
INVESTIGATIVE, CASES AND COMMENTARY 382 (2007). This argument presupposes that 
satellite collection would constitute a search. The next paragraph addresses this issue more 
thoroughly. 
 144. Special needs cases are essentially those not focused on criminal law enforcement. 
See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Ultimately, the analysis and result of such a case may end up looking something akin 
to an administrative search. See id. 
 147. See supra note 55–56 and accompanying text. “Minimization efforts” are rules to 
ensure potential privacy invasions are limited and any evidence related thereto is destroyed. 
While there are apparently certain minimization processes currently in place, these should 
arguably be strengthened in any new statutory scheme that Congress adopts. 
 148. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 143, at 382. 
 149. 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (emphasis added). 
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use of a thermal imaging device to detect heat emissions from a 
suspect’s house was unconstitutional absent a warrant.150 
Importantly, the Kyllo holding rested largely on the fact that such 
thermal imaging tools were not generally in public use,151 so an 
individual’s expectation of privacy was higher than it might have 
been with other possible law enforcement techniques. Applying Dow 
Chemical and Kyllo to satellite technology, a court would likely 
determine that since satellites are not widely available to the general 
public, an individual’s expectation of privacy against a satellite search 
would be high.152 
3. Bifurcated organizational structure  
In light of these PCA and Fourth Amendment issues, then, 
bifurcating the domestic imagery program into distinct law 
enforcement and disaster related operations seems to be precisely the 
correct approach. As explained, current constitutional and statutory 
provisions likely limit—if not altogether prevent—the ability to use 
reconnaissance satellite imagery domestically for law enforcement 
purposes. That fact, however, should not prevent or impede its use 
in disaster planning and response, though that is exactly what has 
happened. To the extent, therefore, that the government still 
believes domestic collection for law enforcement ought to be 
pursued, those efforts should continue independent of efforts to 
establish a more coherent domestic imagery strategy for disasters.153 
 
 150. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 151. Id. 
 152. These cases assert that if law enforcement officers were to obtain a warrant, the use 
of satellite technology would perhaps be permissible. The conundrum, however, is that the 
very purpose of using satellite imagery would likely be to establish probable cause, which is the 
standard of proof required to obtain a warrant in the first place. In other words, if law 
enforcement officers were able to establish the level of proof required to obtain a warrant to 
use satellite technology, they would likely not need to use it, since they could instead simply 
procure a warrant to search a house. SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 143, at 72. Thus, just 
as the “Court’s holding in Kyllo put[] an end to the law enforcement use of thermal imaging 
devices to scan homes,” the same result would likely flow from any case regarding satellite 
imagery collection for law enforcement purposes. Id. 
 153. On this point, it bears mentioning that in the DHS press release announcing the 
closure of the NAO, DHS indicated that the office was being shut down because of changing 
priorities. This was perhaps driven by the fact that law enforcement officials themselves 
indicated that they had other issues more pressing than the NAO. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano Announces Decision to End National Applications 
Office Program (June 23, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1245785980174. 
shtm. 
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In the meantime, in order to provide adequate governance and long-
term stability to the domestic imaging program, the government 
should establish an office responsible for fielding domestic imaging 
requests for disaster planning. While some might contend that the 
CAC performs this function already, its ad hoc operating structure 
and the numerous indicia of missed collection opportunities belie 
that argument. Moreover, the 2005 CAC independent study noted 
that “a committee structure was not the most efficient process and 
that without multi-department level support and dedicated resources 
it would not be sustainable.”154  
As for the best placement of such an organization within the 
government, the plans to situate the NAO within DHS seem 
prudent since FEMA is housed within DHS. There are several 
features that make placing the NAO within FEMA a particularly 
logical organizational choice. First, the agency already has a Mapping 
and Analysis Center that uses imagery products to prepare for and 
respond to disasters.155 In fact, even when NGA assets have been 
used in the past to support domestic disasters, they have been 
provided only after a request from FEMA.156 Beyond that, placement 
within FEMA seems appropriate given that improving readiness for, 
response to, and recovery from disasters is one of DHS’s top five 
priorities.157 While it might be more organizationally efficient to 
house the domestic imaging program within NGA—since it already 
manages the bulk of imagery collection and interpretation—such a 
proposal could perpetuate the perception that the government is 
spying on U.S. persons.158 Moreover, part of the current problem is 
that NGA already holds a great deal of unilateral authority over the 
imagery collection process. Placement of the domestic imaging 
program within FEMA would defuse many of the civil liberties 
concerns surrounding domestic imagery collection since FEMA’s 
focus has traditionally been on disaster response rather than law 
 
 154. CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 43. 
 155. See FEMA, http://www.gismaps.fema.gov/rs.shtm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 156. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA Supports Federal 
Response to California Wildfires (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.nga.mil/NGASiteContent/ 
StaticFiles/OCR/nga0712.pdf; Press Release, Nat’l Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, NGA 
Makes Imagery of Midwest Flooding Available to the Public (June 20, 2008), 
http://www.nga.mil/NGASiteContent/StaticFiles/OCR/nga0806.pdf. 
 157. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Department Responsibilities, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xabout/responsibilities.shtm#four (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 158. See CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 44. 
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enforcement missions. Finally, housing the domestic imagery 
collection program within FEMA would allow it to benefit from the 
oversight of DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.159 
B. Codification of Imaging Policy 
Even if this governance proposal seems too challenging, the 
government should at least pursue the CAC study group’s 
recommendation to pursue a comprehensive review of the laws, 
policies, and practices governing domestic reconnaissance satellite 
imagery collection.160 As the study group noted, the executive 
agreements and policies used to sustain the program to this point 
have created an indecipherable “complex web of law” that 
contributes to the underutilization of this resource.161 And while 
Congress has thus far evidently acquiesced to this situation, 
congressional input is critical to creating a more comprehensive and 
clearly defined domestic imaging strategy. 
There are a variety of possible approaches to solving this 
problem. First, since there are arguably no constitutional violations 
for domestic satellite collection limited to disasters, Congress could 
simply develop and enact clear laws codifying—and therefore 
legitimizing—existing intra-executive memoranda, directives, and 
practices. To the extent that this effort would create a unified 
framework around the domestic imagery collection program, it 
would serve to unravel the current complexities related to these 
efforts. During this process, Congress could also strengthen these 
laws and policies to ensure that appropriate minimization efforts, 
remedies, and sanctions for violations are included.162 While this 
proposal might first appear to waste effort and energy (in that it 
would essentially only reinforce the status quo), the congressional 
“stamp-of-approval” is necessary to alleviate the confusion and 
concern currently surrounding the domestic use of reconnaissance 
 
 159. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is responsible for “ensuring respect 
for civil rights and civil liberties in policy decisions and implementation of those decisions” 
within DHS. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., About the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0371.shtm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). 
 160. See CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 5. 
 161. Id. at 33. 
 162. See supra note 147.  
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satellites and to counter the culture of secrecy within the Intelligence 
Community.163  
With this effort being driven by Congress rather than the 
executive, the codification process and outcome will potentially be 
more transparent, potentially assuaging public concerns of executive 
domestic spying. Moreover, Congress’s involvement in drafting these 
laws would also better posture it to engage in oversight activities 
related to these operations.164 Finally, by clarifying existing policies 
and directives with codified statutes, Congress would empower 
members of the Intelligence Community to engage in wider 
information sharing without having to “hedge against uncertainty” 
as to the permissibility of releasing such imagery.165 
Representative Green proposed another possible—and far more 
drastic—approach during the NAO hearings. Concerned that the 
current domestic satellite imaging program vests too much power in 
the executive, he passionately suggested that something akin to FISA 
be implemented, since doing so would ensure that the judiciary 
review and approve the legitimacy of each domestic imagery request. 
Specifically, in directing his comments to the DHS witnesses, he 
stated, “Listen, I am imploring, I beseech you, I beg that you please 
give some consideration to the notion that we need a third branch of 
government or another branch of government involved.”166  
While a comprehensive exploration of this proposal is beyond the 
scope of this paper, there are a few especially significant points worth 
noting. First, it is important to highlight that as presently 
constituted, FISA only applies, as its name suggests, to domestic 
collections made for the purposes of gathering foreign intelligence 
matters.167 Thus, although a strict FISA-like scheme may have very 
limited application to collections designed to prevent disasters caused 
 
 163. In codifying the nation’s domestic imagery policy, Congress can perhaps delegate 
some of this authority rather than delve into all of the particulars. However, given the fact that 
the executive already created the current, confused structure, Congress arguably needs to at 
least establish the basic parameters and broad framework for the program. This may include 
laws establishing such fundamental issues as what general types of imaging are appropriate 
(disaster- related collection but not law enforcement, for example), minimization efforts that 
are necessary to comply with the Fourth Amendment, and penalties that will be imposed for 
abuses.  
 164. Oversight issues are discussed more thoroughly below. See infra Part V.C. 
 165. See CAC BLUE RIBBON STUDY, supra note 6, at 34. 
 166. Hearing, supra note 9, at 28 (statement of Hon. Al Green, Member, H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec.). 
 167. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006). 
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by terrorist attacks,168 it would not seem to address judicial review for 
imagery collection related to other types of manmade or natural 
disasters.169 Another central question Congress would have to 
address if it were to pursue this option is whether the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)—the body that currently 
adjudicates FISA matters—would be the proper court to review the 
legality of satellite imagery requests, or if standard Article III courts 
could do so.170 Additionally, Congress would even have to decide 
how to frame the proceedings. More specifically, any new legislation 
on this front would have to address whether the proceedings would 
be non-adversarial, as the FISC is now,171 or whether amici curiae 
would be appointed to oppose the government’s collection requests. 
Because time is of the essence during disaster response, Congress 
would ultimately also need to consider whether the value of these 
procedures outweighs the opportunities that would inevitably be lost 
by delays in the adjudicative process.  
Clearly, these are only the more obvious issues requiring 
consideration should Congress choose to adopt a policy of judicial 
review for domestic satellite imagery requests. Frankly, given 
congressional inaction related to the program to this point, it seems 
unlikely that Congress will pursue such a complex course of action. 
Nor, in fact, does such a dramatic proposal even seem necessary to 
address the challenges currently plaguing domestic imagery 
collection. Instead, clarifying and codifying existing policies and 
practices seems to be the more realistic and effective approach. 
Doing so would remove much of the uncertainty among analysts as 
to precisely what can be released to domestic users like FEMA and 
state and local disaster responders. Moreover, with clarified legal 
guidance, these domestic users will be more informed about the 
 
 168. Strict adherence to FISA would require the individual subject to surveillance be an 
agent of a foreign power. Id. at § 1801(b). 
 169. This of course is not meant to suggest that judicial review would not be appropriate 
for natural-disaster-related requests; rather, it is intended merely to establish that the 
parameters of any new statutory construct of this sort would have to extend beyond the scope 
of issues currently covered by FISA. 
 170. Each option offers unique advantages; the FISC is already familiar with many 
intelligence issues, but regular Article III courts would arguably be better resourced to handle 
the additional demand. 
 171. See Kristian W. Murray, National Security Veiled in Secrecy: An Analysis of the State 
Secrets Privilege in National Security Agency Wiretapping Litigation, 199 MIL. L. REV. 1, 46 
n.239 (“FISC hearings are non-adversarial proceedings where the government presents 
applications to conduct surveillance.”). 
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requests they can make to better carry out their missions. But 
whatever legislative course Congress eventually pursues, its role 
should not end with the enactment of statutes.  
C. Oversight 
Indeed, in developing the statutory scheme to address the 
confusion surrounding domestic imagery collection, Congress must 
also ensure that there is a corresponding oversight regime to deter 
and uncover any abuses.172 The CAC’s current approach is one of 
self-policing, where agencies making domestic imagery requests 
certify themselves that their collections comply with applicable law. 
While CAC members and NGA officials apparently review these 
certifications, the fact remains that all assessment is currently intra-
executive. Though these mechanisms are certainly important, as one 
commentator has observed, they ultimately amount to the executive 
telling Congress and the public to “trust us; we can handle all of this 
powerful technology, and we will handle it in a manner that is 
consistent with our principles” and with the law.173 The fact that the 
Committee for Homeland Security learned of the NAO from the 
press, however, does not bode well for the reliability of such 
promises. Further, given prior legal concerns raised by other 
domestic Intelligence Community programs, the importance of 
independent oversight is difficult to overstate.174  
 
 172. Perhaps somewhat unwittingly, Congress has already taken a major step in this 
direction. In the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010, Congress amended the Inspector 
General Act of 1978 to include the NRO and NGA as “designated federal entities.” S. REP. 
NO. 111-223, at 59 (2010). With such designation, these offices “will be required by statute to 
administratively appoint inspectors general.” Id. While each agency had in fact previously 
established its own Inspector General (IG) office, because they were not previously within the 
Inspector General Act of 1978, they lacked the degree of authority and independence 
necessary to effectively perform their functions. Id. Given this new amendment, however, 
NRO and NGA IGs will now have greater authority to access information, perform audits, and 
independently report their findings to the DoD IG and the GAO. Id. While such investigations 
will obviously still be conducted entirely within the executive branch, this change nevertheless 
provides another level of oversight to deter and/or discover potential abuses related to the 
domestic imaging program. 
 173. Hearing, supra note 9, at 43 (statement of Barry Steinhardt, Director of the ACLU 
Program on Technology and Liberty). 
 174. As noted above, the CAC itself sprang from investigations into domestic spying by 
the CIA. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. Other examples of questionable 
Intelligence Community programs include the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program and the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Total Information Awareness program. See 
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 85; GINA MARIE STEVENS ET AL., PRIVACY: TOTAL 
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Congress must, therefore, address intelligence oversight issues 
within its own body. As an indication of just how critical this is, the 
9/11 Commission called its proposal to strengthen congressional 
intelligence oversight one of its most important propositions.175 The 
Commission’s recommendation was based on the observation that 
the then-existing intelligence oversight structure was 
“dysfunctional,” and that “intelligence committees lack the power, 
influence, and sustained capability” to protect American interests.176 
Presciently, however, the commission also noted that “[f]ew things 
are more difficult to change in Washington than congressional 
committee jurisdiction and prerogatives.”177 And, in fact, little 
progress has been made since the release of the commission’s report. 
Today, for instance, neither chamber of Congress has a standing 
committee focused specifically on intelligence issues.178 Instead, both 
the House and Senate vest authority for intelligence in select 
committees, which are nominally only temporary bodies, without the 
authority “to receive and report out proposed legislation.”179 
Though these select committees focus exclusively on intelligence 
issues, no fewer than fifteen standing committees oversee some 
aspect of intelligence,180 and many of these committees have 
overlapping jurisdiction.181 Such a complex and fragmented system 
 
INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION ACCESS, COLLECTION, 
AND PROTECTION LAWS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31730 (Mar. 21, 
2003), at CRS-4. 
 175. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 419 (2004). 
 176. Id. at 420. 
 177. Id. at 419. 
 178. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2006).  
 179. Id. at 1662 n.27. 
 180. Id. at 1662. In the House, these are the Appropriations, Armed Services, Budget, 
Energy and Commerce, Government Reform, Homeland Security, International Relations, 
and Judiciary Committees. In the Senate, these are the Appropriations, Armed Services, 
Budget, Energy and Natural Resources, Foreign Relations, Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, and Judiciary Committees. Id. 
 181. The NAO, for example, would likely have been subject to oversight by the select 
intelligence committees, as well as the Appropriations, Homeland Security, Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs, and possibly the Armed Services Committees. For a better idea of 
the scope of this problem, it is worth noting one group’s finding that “no less that 88 
committees and subcommittees in the House and the Senate had responsibility for oversight of 
homeland security.” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNTANGLING 
THE WEB: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 2 
(2004) http://csis.org/files/media/csis/events/041210_dhs_tf_whitepaper.pdf. 
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creates turf-wars that make effective oversight nearly impossible.182 In 
fact, in a recent report judging the status of 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, intelligence oversight reforms received only a “D” 
grade.183 The report specifically noted that “the ability of the 
intelligence committees to perform oversight of the intelligence 
agencies and account for their performance is still undermined by the 
power” of other committees and subcommittees.184 
Congress must address these oversight issues in order to prevent 
potential executive abuses and to ensure the domestic imagery 
program operates within the confines of the legal framework it 
develops. Several proposals have been offered, including one by the 
9/11 Commission to create a joint intelligence committee made up 
of members from both the House and Senate.185 Less drastically, 
Congress could reform the overlapping jurisdictional issues currently 
impeding effective oversight operations by more clearly establishing 
the responsibilities and authorities of each committee.186 Further, 
transforming the intelligence committees into standing committees 
with greater ability to influence intelligence related legislation would 
strengthen the committees.187 Finally, since one of Congress’s 
greatest tools is the power of the purse, the appropriations and 
intelligence committees could be structured to promote better 
cooperation and ensure that funding is only applied to programs that 
are consistent with the nation’s priorities and legal frameworks.188 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The capabilities of reconnaissance satellite imagery make it a 
significant tool in efforts to prepare for and respond to disasters. 
Unfortunately, however, opportunities to use this capability are 
being squandered in light of complex and confusing guidance 
surrounding the legality of its use within the United States. This lack 
of clarity serves to perpetuate secrecy within an already cautious 
 
 182. See O’Connell, supra note 178, at 1663. 
 183. 9/11 PUBLIC DISCOURSE PROJECT, FINAL REPORT ON 9/11 COMMISSION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2005), http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf. 
 184. Id. 
 185. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, supra note 
175, at 420. 
 186. See O’Connell supra note 178, at 1733. 
 187. Id. at 1672. 
 188. See id. at 1673. 
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intelligence community and thus stymies the application of imagery 
even where operations are plainly legal. Further, the disjointed 
nature of the current legal framework also fosters fear within the 
public that “Big Brother” is watching. 
Such concerns can and ought to be eliminated. Though current 
policies are complex and confusing, they at least do not appear to be 
in violation of applicable laws. As explained, this is arguably not the 
case regarding recent efforts to expand the domestic imagery 
program to law enforcement and national security collection. 
Accordingly, such efforts should either be abandoned, or at least 
separated from the government’s disaster-related collection 
framework. Further, to eliminate confusion surrounding the use of 
reconnaissance satellites for disaster issues, Congress should enact 
clear legislation designed to codify the government’s domestic 
collection strategy. After such laws are enacted, Congress must 
continue to monitor the domestic use of satellite imagery by actively 
overseeing the executive agencies engaged in the imagery program. 
By engaging in such continued monitoring, Congress will ensure 
that the appropriate balance is struck between protecting personal 
privacy and allowing the government to utilize capabilities that will 
protect its citizens. Because the next disaster will not wait until this 
legal framework is developed, now is the time to act. 
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